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11. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we are interested in multifunctions F : X →→ X which
possess ﬁxed points or approximate ﬁxed points. Fixed point theorems deal
with suﬃcient conditions on X and F guaranteeing that there exists a ﬁxed
point, that is an ˆ x ∈ X with ˆ x ∈ F(ˆ x). There are many ﬁxed point theo-
rems known on topological spaces (Brouwer [5], Kakutani [8], Banach [3], ...)
w h i c hh a v ep r o v e dt ob eu s e f u li nm a n ya p p l i e dﬁelds such as game theory,
mathematical economics and the theory of quasi-variational inequalities (cf.
Baiocchi and Capelo [2]). If X is a metric space, approximate ﬁxed point
theorems are theorems with conditions on X and F guaranteeing that, for
each ε > 0, there is an ε-ﬁx e dp o i n t ,i .e .a nx∗ ∈ X with d(x∗,F(x∗)) ≤ ε,
where d(x∗,F(x∗)) = inf{d(x∗,z) | z ∈ F(x∗)}. I nT i j s ,T o r r ea n dB r ˆ anzei
[20], approximate ﬁxed point theorems in the spirit of Brouwer, Kakutani
and Banach were derived. In the ﬁrst two theorems, in ﬁnite dimensional
spaces, the compactness conditions used in the above quoted theorems were
replace by boundedness conditions. In the third one, the completeness of the
metric space (used in Banach’s contraction theorem) was dropped.
In this paper we will present some new approximate ﬁxed point theorems
for multifunctions deﬁned in Banach spaces. Weak and strong topologies
play a role and bounded and unbounded regions are allowed.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, ﬁrst we present
some approximate ﬁxed point theorems for closed or upper semicontinuous
(with respect to the weak or strong topologies) multifunctions on bounded or
totally bounded convex regions. Then unbounded convex regions are consid-
ered and here the notion of tame multifunction plays a crucial role. Section 3
gives an outline of how to use approximate ﬁxed point theorems to guarantee
that non-cooperative games have approximate Nash equilibria and Section 4
concludes with some remarks.
22. NEW APPROXIMATE FIXED POINT THEOREMS
In this section, V will be a real Banach space and for F : X →→ X
with X ⊆ V ,t h es e t{x ∈ V | d(x,F(x)) = infy∈F(x) k y − x k≤ ε} of the
ε-ﬁxed points of the multifunction F on X will be denoted by FIXε(F).
First we present two theorems where the weak topology plays a role.
Theorem 2.1 Let V be a reﬂexive real Banach space and let X be a
non-empty bounded and convex subset of V . Assume that F : X →→ X is
a weakly closed multifunction (that is a multifunction closed with respect to
the weak topology) such that F(x) is a non-empty and convex subset of X for
each x ∈ X.T h e nFIXε(F) 6= ∅ for each ε > 0.
Proof. Suppose without loss of generality that 0 ∈ X.L e tα =s u p {k x k
| x ∈ X}.T a k eε > 0a n d0< δ < 1s u c ht h a tδα ≤ ε.L e tY be the weakly
compact and convex subset of X deﬁned by Y =( 1− δ)X,w h e r eX is the
closure of X.D e ﬁne the multifunction G : Y →→ Y by G(x)=( 1−δ)F(x)
for all x ∈ Y .T h e n G is a weakly closed multifunction with non empty,
convex and weakly compact values. But, with respect to the weak topol-
ogy, V is an Hausdorﬀ locally convex topological vector space, so, in view of
Glicksberg’s Theorem [7], G has at least one ﬁxed point on Y .S o t h e r e i s
an x∗ ∈ Y such that x∗ ∈ G(x∗)=( 1− δ)F(x∗). Then there is a z ∈ F(x∗)
such that x∗ =( 1− δ)z,s ok z − x∗ k= δ k z k≤ δα ≤ ε.H e n c e x∗ is an
ε-ﬁxed point of F. 2
Theorem 2.2 Let V be a reﬂexive and separable real Banach space
and let X be a non-empty bounded and convex subset of V . Assume that
F : X →→ X is a weakly upper semicontinuous multifunction (that is a
multifunction upper semicontinuous with respect to the weak topology) such
3that F(x) is a non-empty and convex subset of X for each x ∈ X.T h e n
FIXε(F) 6= ∅ for each ε > 0.
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 2.1, we assume that 0 ∈ X and
α =s u p {k x k| x ∈ X}.T a k e ε > 0, 0 < δ < 1 such that δα ≤ ε
2 and
Y =( 1−δ)X.D e ﬁne the multifunction G : Y →→ Y by G(x)=( 1−δ)F(x)
for all x ∈ Y . G is weakly upper semicontinuous. In fact, since V is a sep-
arable real Banach space and X is bounded, there exists a metric dw on
V such that the weak topology on X is induced by the metric dw (see, for
example, [6, Proposition 8.7]). Let x ∈ Y and assume that A is a weakly
open neighbourhood of G(x). For σ > 0, we denote with Aσ the open
set {y ∈ Y | dw(y,G(x)) < σ}.S i n c e G(x) is weakly compact, we have
that dw(Y \A,G(x)) = inf{dw(y,z) | y ∈ Y \A, z ∈ G(x)} > 0, where
Y \A = {y ∈ Y | y 6∈ A}.S o , i f 0 < σ0 < σ <d w(Y \A,G(x)), we have
G(x) ⊂ Aσ0 ⊂ {y ∈ Y | dw(y,G(x)) ≤ σ0} ⊂ Aσ ⊂ A. In view of the
weakly upper semicontinuity of the multifunction (1 − δ)F, there exists an
open neighbourhood I of x such that (1−δ)F(z) ⊂ Aσ0 for all z ∈ I.T h e r e -
fore G(z)=( 1− δ)F(z) ⊆ {y ∈ Y | dw(y,G(x)) ≤ σ0} ⊂ A for all z ∈ I.
So G is a weakly upper semicontinuous multifunction at x. In the light of
Proposition 4 pag. 72 in [1], G is also a weakly closed multifunction at x.
Therefore, in view of Glicksberg’s theorem, there exists a point x∗ ∈ Y such
that x∗ ∈ G(x∗). Hence, there exists z ∈ F(x∗) such that x∗ =( 1− δ)z,
so k z − x∗ k= δ k z k≤ δα ≤ ε
2. Moreover, there is z0 ∈ F(x∗)s u c ht h a t
k z0 − z k< ε
2.H e n c ek z0 − x∗ k< ε,t h a ti sx∗ ∈ FIXε(F). 2
In the next theorem the strong topology is involved.
Theorem 2.3 Let V b ear e a lB a n a c hs p a c ea n dl e tX be a non-empty,
convex and totally bounded subset of V . Assume that F : X →→ X is a
closed or upper semicontinuous multifunction such that F(x) is a non-empty
4and convex subset of X for each x ∈ X.T h e nFIXε(F) 6= ∅ for each ε > 0.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that 0 ∈ X.T a k eε > 0a n d η >
0. Since X is totally bounded there exists m ∈ N and x1,...,xm ∈ X such
that X ⊆∪ m
i=1
o
B(xi,η)( s e e ,f o re x a m p l e ,[ 4 ] ) ,w h e r e
o
B(xi,η)={y ∈ V |k
y − xi k< η}.M o r e o v e r ,l e th =m a x {k xi k| i ∈ {1,...,m}}.I f0< δ < 1
the set Y =( 1− δ)X is a non-empty, convex and totally bounded subset of
V .S i n c eY is also closed, Y is complete and therefore compact.
• If we assume that F is a closed multifunction and we take 0 < δ < 1
such that δ(η + h) ≤ ε, then the multifunction G : Y →→ Y deﬁned by
G(x)=( 1− δ)F(x) for all x ∈ Y is closed. This implies by Glicksberg’s
theorem that G possesses a ﬁxed point x∗.T h e nt h e r ei saz ∈ F(x∗)s u c h
that x∗ =( 1− δ)z.B e c a u s eX ⊆∪ m
i=1
o
B(xi,η), there exists an r ∈ {1,...,m}
such that z ∈
o
B(xr,η). So k x∗ − z k= δ k z k≤ δ(k z − xr k + k xr k) <
δ(η + h) ≤ ε. Hence x∗ ∈ FIXε(F).
• Assume now that F is an upper semicontinuous multifunction. We take
0 < δ < 1 such that δ(η + h) ≤ ε
2.L e t G : Y →→ Y deﬁned by
G(x)=( 1−δ)F(x) for all x ∈ Y . We claim that G is upper semicontinuous.
In fact, let x ∈ Y and assume that A is an open neighbourhood of G(x). If
σ > 0, we denote with Aσ the open set {y ∈ Y | infz∈G(x) k z − y k< σ}.
Since G(x) is compact, we have that d(Y \A,G(x)) = inf{k y − z k|
y ∈ Y \A, z ∈ G(x)} > 0. So, if 0 < σ0 < σ <d (Y \A,G(x)), we have
G(x) ⊂ Aσ0 ⊂ Aσ0 = {y ∈ Y | infz∈G(x) k z − y k≤ σ0} ⊂ Aσ ⊂ A.
In view of the upper semicontinuity of the multifunction (1 − δ)F,t h e r e
exists an open neighbourhood I of x such that (1 − δ)F(z) ⊂ Aσ0 for all
z ∈ I. Therefore G(z)=( 1− δ)F(z) ⊆ Aσ0 ⊂ A for all z ∈ I.S o G is
an upper semicontinuous multifunction at x and is also a closed multifunc-
tion at x. Therefore, in view of Glicksberg’s theorem, there exists a point




B(xi,η), there exists an s ∈ {1,...,m} such that z ∈
o
B(xs,η), so
5k z−x∗ k= δ k z k≤ δ(k z−xs k + k xs k) < δ(η+h) ≤ ε
2.B u tt h e r ee x i s t sa
z0 ∈ F(x∗) such that k z0−z k< ε
2,s ok z0−x∗ k< ε,t h a ti sx∗ ∈ FIXε(F). 2
The next theorems deal with the existence of approximate ﬁxed points for
multifunctions on convex regions which are not necessarily bounded. Useful
here is the notion of a tame multifunction, which we introduce in
Definition 2.1 Let U be a normed space and X ⊆ U with 0 ∈ X.A
multifunction F : X →→ X is called a tame multifunction if, for each ε > 0,
there is an R>0 such that for each x ∈ B(0,R) ∩ X the set F(x)∩B(0,R+ε)
is non-empty, where B(0,R)={z ∈ U |k z k≤ R}.
Example 2.1 For a normed linear space U the translation T : U −→ U
given by T(x)=x + a,w h e r ea ∈ U\{0}, is not tame and T has for small
ε > 0n oε-ﬁxed points.
Example 2.2 The map F :[ 0 ,∞[→→ [0,∞[d e ﬁned by
F(x)=[ x +( x +1 )
−1,∞[ for all x ∈ [0,∞[
is a tame multifunction and F has ε-ﬁxed points for each ε > 0.
Example 2.3 Each F : X →→ X,w h e r eX is a bounded subset of a
normed space U and F(x) is non-empty for all x ∈ X is a tame multifunction.
Theorem 2.4 Let X be a convex subset, containing 0,o far e ﬂexive real
Banach space. Assume that F : X →→ X is a tame and weakly closed mul-
tifunction such that F(x) is a non-empty and convex subset of X for each
x ∈ X.T h e nFIXε(F) 6= ∅ for each ε > 0.
Proof.T a k eε > 0a n dR>0s u c ht h a tF(x) ∩ B(0,R+ ε
2) 6= ∅ for each
6x ∈ B(0,R) ∩ X.L e t C = B(0,R) ∩ X. C is a non-empty, bounded and








)f o r a l lx ∈ C
satisﬁes the conditions of Theorem 2.1. Hence there is x∗ ∈ FIX
ε
4(G)s u c h
that d(x∗,G(x∗)) ≤ ε
4 < ε
2 and there exists x0 ∈ G(x∗) such that k x0−x∗ k<
ε
2. Moreover there exists an element z ∈ F(x∗)s u c ht h a tz = R−1(R + ε
2)x0.
This implies that


















So x∗ ∈ FIXε(F). 2
Theorem 2.5 Let X be a convex subset, containing 0,o far e ﬂexive and
separable real Banach space. Assume that F : X →→ X is a tame and
weakly upper semicontinuous multifunction such that F(x) is a non-empty
and convex subset of X for each x ∈ X.T h e nFIXε(F) 6= ∅ for each ε > 0.
Proof. Using the same arguments of the proof of Theorem 2.4, we can









satisfy the conditions of Theorem 2.2 and the conclusion follows as in Theo-
rem 2.4. 2
3. APPROXIMATE NASH EQUILIBRIA FOR STRATEGIC
GAMES
In Nash [10], Nash-equilibria for n-person non-cooperative games were
introduced. Further using Kakutani’s ﬁxed point theorem it was shown that
7mixed extensions of ﬁnite n-person games non-cooperative games possess at
least one Nash equilibrium. With the aid of best response multifunctions
for each player the aggregate best response multifunction on the Cartesian
product of the strategy spaces was constructed and the ﬁxed points of this
multifunction coincide with the Nash equilibria of the game.
Of course, for many non-cooperative games Nash equilibria do not exist.
Interesting are games for which still ε-Nash equilibria exist for each ε > 0.
Here a strategy proﬁle is called an ε-Nash equilibrium if unilateral deviation
of one of the players does not increase his payoﬀ with more than ε.O n ec a n
try to derive the existence of approximate equilibrium points following the
next scheme:
(i) develop ε-ﬁxed point theorems and ﬁnd conditions on strategy spaces and
payoﬀ functions of the game such that the aggregate ε-best response multi-
function satisﬁes conditions in an ε-ﬁxed point theorem;
(ii) add extra conditions on the payoﬀ-functions, guaranteeing that points in
the cartesian product of the strategy spaces nearby each other have payoﬀs
suﬃciently nearby.
We will derive in this section a key proposition, which gives the possibility
to ﬁnd various approximate equilibrium theorems.
First we recall some deﬁnitions. An n-person strategic game is a tuple
Γ = hX1,...,X n,u 1,...,uni where for each player i ∈ N = {1,...,n} Xi is the
set of strategies and ui :
Q
i∈N Xi −→ R is the payoﬀ function. If players
1,...,n choose strategies x1,...,xn,t h e nu1(x1,...,xn),...,un(x1,...,xn) are the








∗)+ε for all xi ∈ Xi and for all i ∈ N.
Here x∗
−i is a shorthand for (x∗
j)j∈N\{i} and we will denote by NEε(Γ)t h es e t
of ε-Nash equilibria. Note that for an x∗ ∈ NEε(Γ), a unilateral deviation
8by a player does not improve the payoﬀ with more than ε. Useful will be
for each i ∈ N the ε-best response multifunction Bε
i :
Q




i(x−i)={xi ∈ Xi | ui(xi,x −i) ≥ sup
ti∈Xi
ui(ti,x −i) − ε}








Obviously, if x∗ ∈ Bε(x∗), then x∗ ∈ NEε(Γ)a n dc o n v e r s e l y .S oi fBε has a
ﬁx e dp o i n t ,t h e nw eh a v ea nε-Nash equilibrium. If we do not know whether
Bε has a ﬁxed point but we know that Bε has δ-ﬁxed points for each δ > 0,
then this leads under extra continuity conditions to the existence of approx-
imate Nash equilibria for the game as we will see.
The next result we call the key proposition because this proposition opens
the door to obtain diﬀerent ε-equilibrium point theorems, using as inspiration
source the existing literature on Nash equilibrium point theorems. Many of
them contain collections of suﬃcient conditions on strategy space and payoﬀ
functions, guaranteeing that the aggregate best response multifunction has a
ﬁxed point. To guarantee the existence of ε-ﬁxed points one has to modify,
often in an obvious way, the conditions guaranteeing the existence of δ-ﬁxed
points for the aggregate ε-best response multifunction and to replace the
condition (iii) in the key proposition by the obtained conditions.
KEY PROPOSITION Let Γ = hX1,...,Xn,u 1,...,uni be an n-person
strategic game with the following three properties:
(i) for each i ∈ N = {1,...,n}, the strategy space Xi is endowed with a metric
di;
(ii) the payoﬀ functions u1,...,un are uniform continuous functions on X =
9Qn




di(xi,y i) for all x,y ∈ X;
(iii) for each ε > 0 and δ > 0, the aggregate ε-best response multifunction
Bε possesses at least one δ-ﬁx e dp o i n t ,i .e .FIXδ(Bε) 6= ∅.
Then, NEε(Γ) 6= ∅ for each ε > 0.
Proof.T a k e ε > 0 . B e c a u s eo f( i i )w ec a nﬁnd η > 0s u c ht h a tf o ra l l
x,x0 ∈ X with d(x,x0) < η we have | ui(x)−ui(x0) |< 1














2ε), which is possible by (iii). Then there is an ˆ x ∈
B
1














ε for all i ∈ N. (1)












ε for all i ∈ N. (2)









−i) − ε for all i ∈ N, (3)
a n dt h i si se q u i v a l e n tt ox∗ ∈ NEε(Γ). 2
It will be clear that using the key proposition many approximate Nash
equilibrium theorems can be obtained. We restrict ourselves here in giving
two examples.
10Example 3.1 (Games on the open unit square). Let h]0,1[,]0,1[,u 1,u 2i
be a game with uniform continuous payoﬀ functions u1 and u2. Suppose that
u1 is concave in the ﬁrst coordinate and u2 is concave in the second coordi-
nate. Then for each ε > 0, the game has an ε-Nash equilibrium point.
Example 3.2 (Completely mixed approximate Nash equilibria for ﬁnite





∆n,u 1,u 2i,w h e r e :
o
∆m = {p ∈ R





∆n = {q ∈ R











Then for each ε > 0 this game has an ε-Nash equilibrium. Such an ε-Nash
equilibrium is called completely mixed, because both players use each of their
pure strategies with a positive probability.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In Section 2 we developed new approximate ﬁxed point theorems in
inﬁnite dimensional spaces. It seems important to ﬁnd more sophisticated ap-
proximate ﬁxed point theorems, especially for multifunctions on unbounded
sets. Also ﬁnding new applications in economic theory and in the study of
well-posed ﬁxed point problems (Lemaire, Salem and Revalsky [9]) could be
interesting. In Section 3 we indicated, via the key proposition, how approx-
imate ﬁxed point theorems can play a role in non-cooperative game theory
to prove the existence of approximate Nash equilibria. For a survey of tech-
niques to prove the existence of (ε-) Nash equilibria see Tijs [19]. For ap-
proximate equilibrium theorems using approximations of games with smaller
11subgames see Lucchetti, Patrone and Tijs [13]. Also we want to refer to
Lignola [10] for the existence of Nash equilibria for games with non compact
strategy sets and to Lignola and Morgan [11] for convergence of Nash equilib-
ria. The importance of ε-Nash equilibria is also motivated by well-posedness
for Nash equilibria (cf. Lignola and Morgan [12], Margiocco, Patrone and
Pusillo Chicco [16]), convergence properties of approximate Nash equilib-
ria (cf. Morgan and Raucci [17]) and approximate solutions for hierarchical
games (cf. Mallozzi and Morgan [14] and Mallozzi and Morgan [15] for ap-
proximate mixed strategies).
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